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Out of the new geopolitical landscape that emerged 
from the fall of the Soviet Union, the emergence of three 
small nations on the western coast of the Baltic beacme 
important. These states raced to ensure their indepen-
dence by assimilating into the Western European family 
of nations as rapidly as possible. Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia have drawn on their prior experience of inde-
pendence during the interwar period of 1918-1940 to 
create national strategies with the aim of protecting their 
post-Soviet autonomy. The Baltic nations continued in-
tegration with western economic, political, and military 
institutions is sustainable, and will be pursued into the 
foreseeable future.
 
The past two hundred years of history of the Baltic na-
tions is important, as it greatly influenced the nations’ 
security strategies through th 21st century. Despite being 
a part of the Russian Empire in the 19th century, all three 
Baltic nations strived to retain their cultural, linguistic, 
and religious independence from increasing efforts to 
“Russify” the region. Estonia and Latvia were majority 
Lutheran and Lithuania was largely Catholic, helping to 
combat the spread of the Eastern Orthodoxy variant of 
Christianity into the region. Also, the Estonian, Latvian, 
and Lithuanian languages all use romantic characters in 
their written forms as opposed to Cyrillic. Along with 
trade ties to Western Europe, these key cultural factors 
helped to ensure societal integrity and contributed to an 
affinity towards the West rather than the East.
The twenty-year period of independence following the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918 allowed all three nations 
to pursue a developmental strategy in line with Western 
European values. However, this process was cut short 
in 1940, when a Soviet invasion led to the first occupa-
tion.  The new puppet governments set up by the invad-
ers largely surrendered Baltic independence by becom-
ing member states of the Soviet Union.  Dissenters were 
sent to the gulags in Siberia or simply executed.  The next 
year, with the German invasion of The Soviet Union, the 
Baltic nations fell into Nazi hands.  The Germans were 
viewed as liberators to many inhabitants of the region; 
however this was not consistent across all three nations. 
The Soviet counter-offensive in 1944 led to the final oc-
cupation of the Baltic nations, which would last until the 
fall of the Warsaw Pact.
It is difficult to understate the impact that this succession 
of repeated occupations had on the Baltic States’ views 
of state security.  The Soviet deportations of hundreds of 
thousands of political prisoners, resistance fighters, and 
their families left a very real impression on what inde-
pendence and self-determination means to the people of 
the Baltic lands.  Thus, the issue of state integrity and 
independence is viewed as a serious privilege, one where 
the consequences of failure are still fresh in national 
memory.
Geographic and Ethnic Challenges for Baltic Security
The simple factor of geography presents a challenge to 
Baltic security, as all three  Baltic Nations are fairly close 
to major population centers of Russia. Estonia is the 
most egregiously close, as her capital, Tallinn, is less than 
250 miles away from St. Petersburg. Another liability is 
the Polish-Lithuanian border, which runs between Ka-
liningrad and Belarus with a width of only 40 miles.  In 
a military conflict, this corridor could very easily be cut 
off, isolating all three  Baltic Nations from their NATO 
allies via land. The Russian exclave of Kaliningrad boasts 
over 1 million inhabitants, is home to Russia’s Baltic Sea 
fleet, and reportedly Iskander tactical ballistic missiles. 
Undoubtedly, Kaliningrad’s location, and active military 
forces, the proximity to Russian soil, and past attempts 
at Russification of the region constitute a considerable 
threat to Baltic national security.
The presence of substantial ethnic Russian minorities in 
the  Baltic Nations presents an opportunity for Krem-
lin-initiated agitation, although this threat is more pro-
nounced in Latvia and Estonia than Lithuania. 31.3% of 
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Russian interest groups, such as ethnic Poles. 
Additionally, Russian-orientated media outlets are of 
great concern to Baltic policymakers and elites.  Media 
can influence certain worldviews or beliefs, particularly 
when targeted at ethnic, cultural, or linguistic groups. 
Television stations such as First Baltic, RTR, Planeta and 
NTV Mir have been known to present information with a 
decidedly Kremlin bias.  Russian civil society groups and 
media entities have consistently operated with the intent 
of undermining Baltic independence. Baltic governments 
aren’t ignoring these perceived efforts to influence domes-
tic Russian-speaking populations.  Early this year, a Lithu-
anian media watchdog agency banned Russian television 
channel NTV Mir from operating for three months due to 
a provocative movie, which expressed an alternate view of 
the 1991 Soviet massacre of 13 Lithuanian civilians 1991 
in an attempt to take control of the Vilnius television tow-
er.
It is not unreasonable to predict a scenario where Russian 
agents enter a heavily Russian region in Latvia or Esto-
nia and attempt to agitate armed resistance against the 
Baltic authorities. The September 2014 scandal regarding 
the kidnapped Estonian intelligence agent on Estonian 
soil has shown Russian authorities’ disregard for nation-
al boundaries. The most obvious target of such agitation 
Latvia’s population and 27.9% of Esto-
nia’s population is ethnic Russian, Belar-
usian, or Ukrainian while Lithuania has 
roughly 7%. 
Latvia and Estonia have taken tough 
stances against Russian minorities.  Fol-
lowing the end of the Soviet Union, both 
nations required language tests in their 
respective native tongues in order to 
qualify for national citizenship.  Many 
ethnic Russians were left disillusioned, 
as both Latvian and Estonian are fairly 
difficult languages to learn, and those 
of the older generation often had little 
desire to adopt another language at all. 
Some did not accept the Russian Feder-
ation’s offer of citizenship for all former 
citizens of the Soviet Union due to the 
higher standard of living and increased 
opportunities in Latvia and Estonia. A large portion of 
these individuals received grey passports, which, af-
ter 2007, allowed for unrestricted travel throughout 
the Schengen Zone, in addition to relatively easy travel 
throughout Russia and members of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States. However, grey-passport holders 
are unable to vote in national elections in Latvia and Es-
tonia, making true democratic representation difficult to 
achieve.
In addition to the aforementioned freedom of move-
ment a “stateless” grey-passport holder enjoys, most eth-
nic Russians are fairly content living in the  Baltic Na-
tions. Lt. Col James Corum, Dean of the Baltic Defense 
College in Tartu, Estonia, expressed that during his time 
teaching at Tartu University, many of his ethnic Russian 
students have thrived in the Estonian educational sys-
tem and were eventually employed by Estonian firms. 
Corum also claimed that they do not have much interest 
or attachment to the Russian state.  This speaks to the 
long-term trend of assimilation, even with the starkest 
example of ethnic tension in Estonia.  Lithuania, which 
features a smaller proportion of ethnic Russians, has 
largely integrated them into their society.  This is part-
ly due to less political representation of the smaller eth-
nic population, forcing collaboration between marginal 
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would be Narva, a small city of 60,000 in Northeastern 
Estonia inhabited by 90% ethnic Russians. How success-
ful any agitation would be is questionable, considering the 
higher standard of living and superior economic opportu-
nities in Estonia verses Russia proper. 
The Risk of Dependency on Russian Energy
The question of energy security in the  Baltic Nations has 
been arguably the most pressing issue following their in-
dependence. Lithuania and Latvia are, in one way or an-
other, completely dependent on Russian oil and gas for 
their energy needs. Corum claimed that, “energy supply 
is a key issue that is mentioned by almost all the Baltic 
leaders and academics as a major national security con-
cern.”  Domestic sources of energy have been stymied by 
lack of diversification and increasing European Union 
regulations.  Lithuania 
once relied on the Ignalina 
nuclear reactor, however 
European Union concerns 
with the safety of nuclear 
energy and the age of the 
plant led to its decommis-
sioning.  Shale gas exploita-
tion has also been delayed 
due to EU environmental 
concerns.
The exception is Estonia, 
which harvests a portion 
of its energy supply from 
shale oil and is a net export-
er of energy.  How long this 
will remain is questionable, 
with the dirty nature of this 
extraction and growing 
anti-shale oil sentiments 
in the European Union at 
large. However, all natural 
gas imports to Estonia are 
provided from Russia. As 
the  Baltic Nations accepted 
European Union economic 
integration and regulato-
ry compliance, the further 
dependent they became 
on their Eastern neighbor, 
and the more leverage that was awarded to Russia.  It is 
noteworthy to mention that this is not only a problem 
with the  Baltic Nations, but many members of Eastern 
Europe as well.
With recent events in Ukraine showcasing a resurgent 
Russia, Lithuania and Latvia are making plans to increase 
their energy independence. In Spring 2015 the Lithu-
anian government ordered a floating liquefied natural 
gas terminal dubbed “Independence.” It arrived in the 
port city of Klaipeda to accept natural gas exports from 
the United States and diversify Lithuania’s energy source 
portfolio, as well as make a political statement. Latvia is 
continuing to diversify its energy mix by bringing in ad-
ditional renewable sources such as hydroelectric power.
In addition to attempts to align 
the Baltic energy sector with Eu-
rope, currency and finance have 
also been pathways towards the 
West. The arrival of the euro as 
a replacement of the lita in Lith-
uania this past January marked 
the moment all three Baltic Na-
tions became fully integrated 
into the Euro-Zone.  With Lat-
via and Estonia joining in 2014 
and 2011 respectively, the Euro 
was the natural progression in 
the  Baltic Nations’ quest for 
Western European integration. 
All three nations have fairly 
strong growth rates, even de-
spite the situation in Ukraine 
and perceived vulnerability to 
potential Russian military ag-
gression or economic sanctions. 
While the introduction of the 
euro brings eases trade with 
Western European nations, its 
presence also acts as a compo-
nent in national security. Any 
potential invasion of a member 
of the Eurozone adds another 
dimension to the scenario, and 
increased repercussions for the 
invader. Latvian Freedom Monument
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NATO country, to a multinational force of twelve aircraft. 
In fall 2014, the United States deployed armored assets to 
all three Baltic countries, totaling twenty tanks along with 
infantry support. Despite the perceived escalation of mili-
tary forces in the Baltics, the likelihood of an engagement 
with Russian forces remains slim. The main goal of these 
actions is to send a message that NATO takes its Article 
5 obligations seriously and is willing to deploy forces as 
deterrence.
 
Nearly twenty-five years of independence have given the 
Baltic nations the opportunity to align with western insti-
tutions in a bid for security from their eastern neighbor. 
This strategy has been economically and politically suc-
cessful so far, and appears to be sustainable, assuming both 
Western societal stability and a continuing international 
will to protect the Baltic States from eastern aggression.
Baltic Involvement in NATO
All three  Baltic Nations have been ac-
tive participants in NATO since their 
admission in 2004.  In addition, they 
have all been consistent partners in 
the NATO-led missions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, actively pledging troops 
whenever possible. While Latvia and 
Lithuania have struggled to meet the 2% 
defense spending baseline requested by 
NATO, Estonia is currently meeting the 
minimum requirement. Recent rheto-
ric out of Moscow, the crisis in Eastern 
Ukraine, and the invasion of Crimea 
seem to be having a persuasive effect 
on both Lithuania and Latvia in regards 
to increasing their defense expenditure 
as they seek to solidify their position as 
NATO allies. Lithuania even reinstated 
conscription for a five-year term in or-
der to bolster army manpower by 3,000 
to 3,500 soldiers per annum.
As NATO members, the  Baltic Na-
tions are entitled to the Article 5 notion 
of collective defense. This is the most important aspect 
of the Baltic nations’ national security strategies.  Rely-
ing on allies is not only the most logical decision for the 
nations, but, practically speaking, it is their only option 
when facing a populous and militarily-powerful coun-
try such as Russia. In fact, Lithuanian military doctrine 
purports that, in case of invasion, small squads of sol-
diers will conduct guerilla activities aimed at harassing 
the invading force long enough for conventional NATO 
reinforcements to arrive. This reflects Lithuanian experi-
ences following the second Soviet occupation, where the 
“forest brothers” waged unconventional warfare for sev-
eral years, expecting an American and Western European 
liberation that never materialized.
The emergence of an unpredictable and militant Russian 
foreign policy has without question affected the strategic 
balance in the Baltic States.  Russian aircraft have been 
increasingly willing to violate Estonian airspace, with 
over five incursions in 2014 alone. These violations have 
led to the Baltic Air Policing mission being bolstered 
from a rotating contingent of four aircraft from a single 
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